Flocks, herds and schools: A distributed behavioral model
SIGGRAPH '87 Proceedings of the 14th annual conference on Computer graphics and interactive techniques
Plans and situated actions: the problem of human-machine communication
Plans and situated actions: the problem of human-machine communication
Intelligence without representation
Artificial Intelligence
The owl and the electric encyclopedia
Artificial Intelligence
The computational brain
Designing emergent behaviors: from local interactions to collective intelligence
Proceedings of the second international conference on From animals to animats 2 : simulation of adaptive behavior: simulation of adaptive behavior
Object-oriented software construction (2nd ed.)
Object-oriented software construction (2nd ed.)
Real people and virtual bodies: How disembodied can embodiment be?
Minds and Machines
From agency to apperception: through kinaesthesia to cognition and creation
Ethics and Information Technology
Patterns in world dynamics indicating agency
Transactions on computational collective intelligence III
Agency and situatedness in cognitive engineering
Proceedings of the 29th Annual European Conference on Cognitive Ergonomics
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In this paper we consider the concept of a self-aware agent. In cognitive science agents are seen as embodied and interactively situated in worlds. We analyse the meanings attached to these terms in cognitive science and robotics, proposing a set of conditions for situatedness and embodiment, and examine the claim that internal representational schemas are largely unnecessary for intelligent behaviour in animats. We maintain that current situated and embodied animats cannot be ascribed even minimal self-awareness, and offer a six point definition of embeddedness, constituting minimal conditions for the evolution of a sense of self. This leads to further analysis of the nature of embodiment and situatedness, and a consideration of whether virtual animats in virtual worlds could count as situated and embodied. We propose that self-aware agents must possess complex structures of self-directed goals; multi-modal sensory systems and a rich repertoire of interactions with their worlds. Finally, we argue that embedded agents will possess or evolve local co-ordinate systems, or points of view, relative to their current positions in space and time, and have a capacity to develop an egocentric space. None of these capabilities are possible without powerful internal representational capacities.