Securing every bit: authenticated broadcast in radio networks
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Secure in-band wireless pairing
SEC'11 Proceedings of the 20th USENIX conference on Security
Making evildoers pay: resource-competitive broadcast in sensor networks
PODC '12 Proceedings of the 2012 ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Proceedings of the sixth ACM conference on Security and privacy in wireless and mobile networks
Redundancy offset narrow spectrum: countermeasure for signal-cancellation based jamming
Proceedings of the 11th ACM international symposium on Mobility management and wireless access
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Inspired by unidirectional error detecting codes that are used in situations where only one kind of bit errors are possible (e.g., it is possible to change a bit "0" into a bit "1", but not the contrary), we propose integrity codes (I-codes) for a radio communication channel, which enable integrity protection of messages exchanged between entities that do not hold any mutual authentication material (i.e. public keys or shared secret keys). The construction of I-codes enables a sender to encode any message such that if its integrity is violated in transmission over a radio channel, the receiver is able to detect it. In order to achieve this, we rely on the physical properties of the radio channel and on unidirectional error detecting codes. We analyze in detail the use of I-codes on a radio communication channel and we present their implementation on a wireless platform as a "proof of concept". We further introduce a novel concept called "authentication through presence", whose broad applications include broadcast authentication, key establishment and navigation signal protection. We perform a detailed analysis of the security of our coding scheme and we show that it is secure within a realistic attacker model.