Understanding packet delivery performance in dense wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Embedded networked sensor systems
Key distribution techniques for sensor networks
Wireless sensor networks
Feasibility and complexity of broadcasting with random transmission failures
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Location-based broadcasting for dense mobile ad hoc networks
MSWiM '05 Proceedings of the 8th ACM international symposium on Modeling, analysis and simulation of wireless and mobile systems
Reliable broadcast in radio networks: the bounded collision case
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
A jamming-resistant MAC protocol for single-hop wireless networks
Proceedings of the twenty-seventh ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Secure communication over radio channels
Proceedings of the twenty-seventh ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
On the complexity of asynchronous gossip
Proceedings of the twenty-seventh ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Integrity Codes: Message Integrity Protection and Authentication over Insecure Channels
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Concentration of Measure for the Analysis of Randomized Algorithms
Concentration of Measure for the Analysis of Randomized Algorithms
Securing every bit: authenticated broadcast in radio networks
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Partial information spreading with application to distributed maximum coverage
Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGACT-SIGOPS symposium on Principles of distributed computing
A jamming-resistant MAC protocol for multi-hop wireless networks
DISC'10 Proceedings of the 24th international conference on Distributed computing
Conflict on a communication channel
Proceedings of the 30th annual ACM SIGACT-SIGOPS symposium on Principles of distributed computing
MobiSys '11 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Mobile systems, applications, and services
Competitive and Fair Medium Access Despite Reactive Jamming
ICDCS '11 Proceedings of the 2011 31st International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
OPODIS'06 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Principles of Distributed Systems
Clear channel assessment in energyconstrained wideband wireless networks
IEEE Wireless Communications
DISC'07 Proceedings of the 21st international conference on Distributed Computing
Resource-competitive analysis: a new perspective on attack-resistant distributed computing
FOMC '12 Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Foundations of Mobile Computing
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Consider a time-slotted, single-hop, wireless sensor network consisting of n correct devices and and f•n Byzantine devices where f≥0 is any constant; the Byzantine devices may or may not outnumber the correct ones. There exists a trusted sender Alice who wishes to deliver a message m over a single channel to the correct devices. There is also an evil user Carol who controls the Byzantine devices and uses them to disrupt the communication channel. For a constant k≥2, the correct and Byzantine devices each possess a meager energy budget of O(n1/k), Alice and Carol each possess a limited budget of Õ(n1/k), and sending or listening in a slot incurs unit cost. This setup captures the inherent challenges of guaranteeing communication despite scarce resources and attacks on the network. Given this Alice versus Carol scenario, we ask: Is communication of m feasible and, if so, at what cost? We develop a protocol which, for an arbitrarily small constant ε0, ensures that at least (1-ε)n correct devices receive m with high probability. Furthermore, if Carol's devices expend T energy jamming the channel, then Alice and the correct devices each spend only Õ(T1/(k+1)). In other words, delaying the transmission of m forces a jamming adversary to rapidly deplete its energy supply and, consequently, cease attacks on the network.