Conflict on a communication channel

  • Authors:
  • Valerie King;Jared Saia;Maxwell Young

  • Affiliations:
  • University of Victoria, Victoria, BC, Canada;University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, USA;University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 30th annual ACM SIGACT-SIGOPS symposium on Principles of distributed computing
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

Imagine that Alice wants to send a message m to Bob, and that Carol wants to prevent this. Assume there is a communication channel between Alice and Bob, but that Carol is capable of blocking this channel. Furthermore, there is a cost of S dollars to send on the channel, L dollars to listen on the channel and J to block the channel. How much will Alice and Bob need to spend in order to guarantee transmission of m? This problem abstracts many types of conflict in information networks including: jamming attacks in wireless networks and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on the Internet, where the costs to Alice, Bob and Carol represent an expenditure of energy or network resources. The problem allows us to quantitatively analyze the economics of information exchange in an adversarial setting and ask: Is communication cheaper than censorship? We answer this question in the affirmative by showing that it is significantly more costly for Carol to block communication of m than for Alice to communicate it to Bob. Specifically, if S, L and J are fixed constants, and Carol spends a total of B dollars trying to block m, then Alice and Bob must spend only O(Bφ - 1 + 1)=O(B.62+1) dollars in expectation to transmit m, where φ = (1 + √5)/2 is the golden ratio. Surprisingly, this result holds even if (1) B is unknown to both Alice and Bob; (2) Carol knows the algorithms of Alice and Bob, but not their random bits; and (3) Carol has total knowledge of past actions of both players. Finally, we apply our work to two problems: (1) DoS attacks in wireless sensor networks and (2) application-level DDoS attacks in a wired client-server scenario. Our applications show how our results can provide an additional tool in mitigating such attacks.