Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A New Direct Anonymous Attestation Scheme from Bilinear Maps
Trust '08 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Trusted Computing and Trust in Information Technologies: Trusted Computing - Challenges and Applications
Pairing '08 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Pairing-Based Cryptography
A direct anonymous attestation scheme for embedded devices
PKC'07 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Practice and theory in public-key cryptography
A signature scheme with efficient protocols
SCN'02 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Security in communication networks
Ninja: non identity based, privacy preserving authentication for ubiquitous environments
UbiComp '07 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Ubiquitous computing
Direct anonymous attestation (DAA): ensuring privacy with corrupt administrators
ESAS'07 Proceedings of the 4th European conference on Security and privacy in ad-hoc and sensor networks
Group signatures: better efficiency and new theoretical aspects
SCN'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security in Communication Networks
A DAA scheme using batch proof and verification
TRUST'10 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Trust and trustworthy computing
A DAA scheme requiring less TPM resources
Inscrypt'09 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information security and cryptology
On the design and implementation of an efficient DAA scheme
CARDIS'10 Proceedings of the 9th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Application
A (corrected) DAA scheme using batch proof and verification
INTRUST'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Trusted Systems
Formal analysis of anonymity in ECC-Based direct anonymous attestation schemes
FAST'11 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Formal Aspects of Security and Trust
Efficient signatures of knowledge and DAA in the standard model
ACNS'13 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
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Direct anonymous attestation (DAA) is a mechanism for a remote user to provide a verifier with some assurance it is using software and/or hardware from trusted sets of software and/or hardware respectively. In addition, the user is able to control if and when a verifier is able to link two signatures: to determine whether or not they were produced by the same platform. The verifier is never able to tell which which particular platform produced a given signature or pair of signatures. We first address a problem with the proof of security for the original DAA scheme of Brickell, Camenisch and Chen. In particular, we construct an adversary that can tell if its in a simulation or not. We then provide the necessary changes to the simulator such that the adversary can no longer do this and prove this fact, hence repairing the proof. Our main contribution is a security analysis of the Chen, Morrissey and Smart (CMS) DAA scheme. This scheme uses asymmetric bilinear pairings and was proposed without a proof of security. We use the well established simulation based security model of Brickell, Camenisch and Chen and also use a similar proof technique to theirs. We prove the CMS scheme is secure in the random oracle model relative to the bilinear Lysyanskaya, Rivest, Sahai and Wolf (LRSW) assumption, the hardness of discrete logarithms in the groups used and collision resistance of the hash functions used in the scheme.