A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
On the generation of cryptographically strong pseudorandom sequences
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Statistical Zero Knowledge Protocols to Prove Modular Polynomial Relations
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Efficient Group Signature Schemes for Large Groups (Extended Abstract)
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Modern Cryptography: Theory and Practice
Modern Cryptography: Theory and Practice
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Group signatures with verifier-local revocation
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Collision-free accumulators and fail-stop signature schemes without trees
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Group signatures: better efficiency and new theoretical aspects
SCN'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security in Communication Networks
A New Direct Anonymous Attestation Scheme from Bilinear Maps
Trust '08 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Trusted Computing and Trust in Information Technologies: Trusted Computing - Challenges and Applications
Pairing '08 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Pairing-Based Cryptography
On Proofs of Security for DAA Schemes
ProvSec '08 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Provable Security
An efficient direct anonymous attestation scheme with forward security
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on COMMUNICATIONS
A DAA scheme using batch proof and verification
TRUST'10 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Trust and trustworthy computing
A forward secure direct anonymous attestation scheme
MMACTEE'09 Proceedings of the 11th WSEAS international conference on Mathematical methods and computational techniques in electrical engineering
A DAA scheme requiring less TPM resources
Inscrypt'09 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information security and cryptology
Revocation of direct anonymous attestation
INTRUST'10 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Trusted Systems
How to fix two RSA-based PVSS schemes: exploration and solution
ACISP'12 Proceedings of the 17th Australasian conference on Information Security and Privacy
A (corrected) DAA scheme using batch proof and verification
INTRUST'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Trusted Systems
DAA protocol analysis and verification
INTRUST'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Trusted Systems
Flexible and scalable digital signatures in TPM 2.0
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
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Direct anonymous attestation (DAA) is an anonymous authentication scheme adopted by the Trusted Computing Group in its specifications for trusted computing platforms. This paper presents an efficient construction that implements all anonymous authentication features specified in DAA, including authentication with total anonymity, authentication with variable anonymity, and rogue TPM tagging. The current DAA construction is mainly targeted for powerful devices such as personal computers, and their corresponding application areas, but is not entirely suitable for embedded devices with limited computing capabilities (e.g., cell phones or hand-held PDAs). We propose a new construction with more efficient sign and verify protocols, making it more attractive for embedded devices. We prove that the new construction is secure under the strong RSA assumption and the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.