Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The random oracle methodology, revisited (preliminary version)
STOC '98 Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
RSA-OAEP Is Secure under the RSA Assumption
CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Separating Random Oracle Proofs from Complexity Theoretic Proofs: The Non-committing Encryption Case
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A Practical Public Key Cryptosystem Provably Secure Against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Secure Integration of Asymmetric and Symmetric Encryption Schemes
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Analysis of Key-Exchange Protocols and Their Use for Building Secure Channels
EUROCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Optimal Security Proofs for PSS and Other Signature Schemes
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
The Gap-Problems: A New Class of Problems for the Security of Cryptographic Schemes
PKC '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
The random oracle methodology, revisited
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Obtaining a secure and efficient key agreement protocol from (H)MQV and NAXOS
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Lest we remember: cold boot attacks on encryption keys
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
Constructing an ideal hash function from weak ideal compression functions
SAC'06 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Selected areas in cryptography
Hash-and-sign with weak hashing made secure
ACISP'07 Proceedings of the 12th Australasian conference on Information security and privacy
Random oracles and auxiliary input
CRYPTO'07 Proceedings of the 27th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
Stronger security of authenticated key exchange
ProvSec'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Provable security
Security of digital signature schemes in weakened random oracle models
PKC'08 Proceedings of the Practice and theory in public key cryptography, 11th international conference on Public key cryptography
Analysis of random oracle instantiation scenarios for OAEP and other practical schemes
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
On the generic insecurity of the full domain hash
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Salvaging Merkle-Damgård for Practical Applications
EUROCRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 28th Annual International Conference on Advances in Cryptology: the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
How to Confirm Cryptosystems Security: The Original Merkle-Damgård Is Still Alive!
ASIACRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO'11 Proceedings of the 31st annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Security of practical cryptosystems using Merkle-Damgård hash function in the ideal cipher model
ProvSec'11 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Provable security
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This work focuses on vulnerability of hash functions due to sloppy usage or implementation in the real world. If our cryptographic research community succeeded in development of perfectly secure random function as random oracle, it might be broken in some sense by invalid uses. In this paper, we propose a new variant of the random oracle model in order to analyze security of cryptographic protocols under the situation of an invalid use of hash functions. Our model allows adversaries to obtain contents of the hash list of input and output pairs arbitrarily. Also, we analyze security of several prevailing protocols (FDH, OAEP, Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem, Kurosawa-Desmedt cryptosystem, NAXOS) in our model. As the result of analyses, we clarify that FDH and Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem are still secure but others are insecure in our model. This result shows the separation between our model and the standard model.