Universal one-way hash functions and their cryptographic applications
STOC '89 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Signature schemes based on the strong RSA assumption
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
The MD4 Message Digest Algorithm
CRYPTO '90 Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Collision-Resistant Hashing: Towards Making UOWHFs Practical
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
The exact security of digital signatures-how to sign with RSA and Rabin
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Constructing an ideal hash function from weak ideal compression functions
SAC'06 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Selected areas in cryptography
VIETCRYPT'06 Proceedings of the First international conference on Cryptology in Vietnam
Efficient collision search attacks on SHA-0
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Finding collisions in the full SHA-1
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
How to break MD5 and other hash functions
EUROCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Strengthening digital signatures via randomized hashing
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Collision-Resistant no more: hash-and-sign paradigm revisited
PKC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Theory and Practice of Public-Key Cryptography
Leaky Random Oracle (Extended Abstract)
ProvSec '08 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Provable Security
On Randomizing Hash Functions to Strengthen the Security of Digital Signatures
EUROCRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 28th Annual International Conference on Advances in Cryptology: the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Security of digital signature schemes in weakened random oracle models
PKC'08 Proceedings of the Practice and theory in public key cryptography, 11th international conference on Public key cryptography
Domain extension for enhanced target collision-resistant hash functions
FSE'10 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Fast software encryption
Security of encryption schemes in weakened random oracle models
PKC'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography
Generalized first pre-image tractable random oracle model and signature schemes
ACISP'12 Proceedings of the 17th Australasian conference on Information Security and Privacy
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Digital signatures are often proven to be secure in the random oracle model while hash functions deviate more and more from this idealization. Liskov proposed to model a weak hash function by a random oracle together with another oracle allowing to break some properties of the hash function, e.g. a preimage oracle. To avoid the need for collision-resistance, Bellare and Rogaway proposed to use target collision resistant (TCR) randomized pre-hashing. Later, Halevi and Krawczyk suggested to use enhanced TCR (eTCR) hashing to avoid signing the random seed. To avoid the increase in signature length in the TCR construction, Mironov suggested to recycle some signing coins in the message preprocessing. In this paper, we develop and apply all those techniques. In particular, we obtain a generic preprocessing which allows to build strongly secure signature schemes when hashing is weak and the internal (textbook) signature is weakly secure. We model weak hashing by a preimage-tractable random oracle.