Subjective vs. Objective Reality -- The Risk of Running Late

Authors:
Amos Fiat;Hila Pochter
Affiliations:
School of Computer Science, Tel Aviv University,;School of Computer Science, Tel Aviv University,
Venue:
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Year:
2008

Citing 4
Cited 0

Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria

SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Pure nash equilibria in player-specific and weighted congestion games

WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Routing (un-) splittable flow in games with player-specific linear latency functions

ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
Congestion games with player-specific constants

MFCS'07 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

We study selfish agents that have a "distorted view" of reality. We introduce a framework of subjective vs. objective reality. This is very useful to model risk averse behavior. Natural quality of service issues can be cast as special cases thereof.In particular, we study two applicable variants of the price of anarchy paradigm, the subjective price of anarchywhere one compares the "optimal" subjective outcome to the outcome that arises from selfish subjective reality agents, and the objective price of anarchywhere one compares the optimal objective outcome to that derived by selfish subjective agents.