Journal of Computer and System Sciences - 26th IEEE Conference on Foundations of Computer Science, October 21-23, 1985
The Structure and Complexity of Nash Equilibria for a Selfish Routing Game
ICALP '02 Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Theoretical Computer Science - Automata, languages and programming: Algorithms and complexity (ICALP-A 2004)
On the Impact of Combinatorial Structure on Congestion Games
FOCS '06 Proceedings of the 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Network uncertainty in selfish routing
IPDPS'06 Proceedings of the 20th international conference on Parallel and distributed processing
On the complexity of pure-strategy nash equilibria in congestion and local-effect games
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Routing (un-) splittable flow in games with player-specific linear latency functions
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
Subjective vs. Objective Reality -- The Risk of Running Late
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Characterizing the Existence of Potential Functions in Weighted Congestion Games
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Evolutionary equilibrium in Bayesian routing games: Specialization and niche formation
Theoretical Computer Science
Weighted Boolean formula games
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Local search: simple, successful, but sometimes sluggish
ICALP'10 Proceedings of the 37th international colloquium conference on Automata, languages and programming
On the existence of optimal taxes for network congestion games with heterogeneous users
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Interplay between security providers, consumers, and attackers: a weighted congestion game approach
GameSec'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security
Routing and scheduling with incomplete information
DISC'07 Proceedings of the 21st international conference on Distributed Computing
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We consider a special case of weighted congestion games with playerspecific latency functions where each player uses for each particular resource a fixed (non-decreasing) delay function together with a player-specific constant. For each particular resource, the resource-specific delay function and the playerspecific constant (for that resource) are composed by means of a group operation (such as addition or multiplication) into a player-specific latency function. We assume that the underlying group is a totally ordered abelian group. In this way, we obtain the class of weighted congestion games with player-specific constants; we observe that this class is contained in the new intuitive class of dominance weighted congestion games. We obtain the following results: Games on parallel links: - Every unweighted congestion game has a generalized ordinal potential. - There is a weighted congestion game with 3 players on 3 parallel links that does not have the Finite Best-Improvement Property. - There is a particular best-improvement cycle for general weighted congestion games with player-specific latency functions and 3 players whose outlaw implies the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium. This cycle is indeed outlawed for dominance weighted congestion games with 3 players - and hence for weighted congestion games with player-specific constants and 3 players. Network congestion games: For unweighted symmetric network congestion games with player-specific additive constants, it is PLS-complete to find a pure Nash equilibrium. Arbitrary (non-network) congestion games: Every weighted congestion game with linear delay functions and player-specific additive constants has a weighted potential.