Chord: A scalable peer-to-peer lookup service for internet applications
Proceedings of the 2001 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
A reputation-based approach for choosing reliable resources in peer-to-peer networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Experiences Deploying a Large-Scale Emergent Network
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
The Eigentrust algorithm for reputation management in P2P networks
WWW '03 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on World Wide Web
PeerTrust: Supporting Reputation-Based Trust for Peer-to-Peer Electronic Communities
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
TrustGuard: countering vulnerabilities in reputation management for decentralized overlay networks
WWW '05 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on World Wide Web
Service differentiated peer selection: an incentive mechanism for peer-to-peer media streaming
IEEE Transactions on Multimedia
The Peer's Dilemma: A general framework to examine cooperation in pure peer-to-peer systems
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
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While the performance of peer-to-peer (p2p) systems largely depend on the cooperation of the member nodes, there is an inherent conflict between the individuals' self interest and the communal social welfare. In this regard, many interesting parallels between p2p systems and cooperation in human societies can be drawn. On the one hand, human societies are organized around a certain level of altruistic behavior. Whilst, on the other hand, individuals tend to overuse public goods, if they are free to do so. This paper proposes a new incentive scheme that extracts and modifies sociological incentive patterns, based on the Tragedy of Commons analogy, to work efficiently in a p2p environment. It is shown through simulations that this scheme encourages honest peers whilst successfully blocking non-contributors.