Incentives for sharing in peer-to-peer networks
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Modeling and performance analysis of BitTorrent-like peer-to-peer networks
Proceedings of the 2004 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Incentives in BitTorrent induce free riding
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Economics of peer-to-peer systems
Spray computers: Explorations in self-organization
Pervasive and Mobile Computing
Evolving behaviors in the iterated prisoner's dilemma
Evolutionary Computation
Mathematical modeling of incentive policies in p2p systems
Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Economics of networked systems
Cooperation in P2P Systems through Sociological Incentive Patterns
IWSOS '08 Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Self-Organizing Systems
Bayesian analysis of secure P2P sharing protocols
OTM'07 Proceedings of the 2007 OTM confederated international conference on On the move to meaningful internet systems: CoopIS, DOA, ODBASE, GADA, and IS - Volume Part II
Do incentives build robustness in bit torrent
NSDI'07 Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on Networked systems design & implementation
Design space analysis for modeling incentives in distributed systems
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2011 conference
Selfish content replication on graphs
Proceedings of the 23rd International Teletraffic Congress
A survey and comparison of peer-to-peer overlay network schemes
IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
Using game theory to analyze wireless ad hoc networks
IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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The exploration of social dilemmas is being considered a major foundation for encountering the enforced necessities of cooperation in self-organizing environments. Such environments are characterized by self-interested parties and the absence of trusted third parties. Recent approaches apply evolutionary socio-inspired games to formally prove the existence and further prolongation of cooperation patterns within communities. For instance, the Prisoner's Dilemma game has thus provided a rich opportunity to examine self-interested behaviors in pure peer-to-peer networks. However, assuming a total absence of coalitions, incentives and punishment mechanisms, several works argue against a durable maintenance of cooperation neither at single-shot nor repeated-scenarios. In this article, we formally and experimentally demonstrate a counterexample for the latter by applying evolutionary game theory and a particular instance of the Rock-Scissors-Paper game. Our framework proves that the cyclic dominance of certain type of nodes within a P2P system has an impact and introduces a strategic aspect to the evolution of the overall community.