Bayesian analysis of secure P2P sharing protocols

  • Authors:
  • Esther Palomar;Almudena Alcaide;Juan M. Estevez-Tapiador;Julio C. Hernandez-Castro

  • Affiliations:
  • Computer Science Department, Carlos III University of Madrid, Leganes, Madrid;Computer Science Department, Carlos III University of Madrid, Leganes, Madrid;Computer Science Department, Carlos III University of Madrid, Leganes, Madrid;Computer Science Department, Carlos III University of Madrid, Leganes, Madrid

  • Venue:
  • OTM'07 Proceedings of the 2007 OTM confederated international conference on On the move to meaningful internet systems: CoopIS, DOA, ODBASE, GADA, and IS - Volume Part II
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

Ad hoc and peer-to-peer (P2P) computing paradigms pose a number of security challenges. The deployment of classic security protocols to provide services such as node authentication, content integrity or access control, presents several difficulties, most of them due to the decentralized nature of these environments and the lack of central authorities. Even though some solutions have been already proposed, a usual problem is how to formally reasoning about their security properties. In this work, we show how Game Theory -particularly Bayesian games- can be an useful tool to analyze in a formal manner a P2P security scheme. We illustrate our approach with a secure content distribution protocol, showing how nodes can dynamically adapt their strategies to highly transient communities. In our model, some security aspects rest on the formal proof of the robustness of the distribution protocol, while other properties stem from notions such as rationality, cooperative security, beliefs, or best-response strategies.