A calculus for cryptographic protocols: the spi calculus
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A Game Theoretic Framework for Incentives in P2P Systems
P2P '03 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
Influences on cooperation in BitTorrent communities
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Economics of peer-to-peer systems
Game Theory As A Tool To Strategize As Well As Predict Nodes Behavior In Peer-to-Peer Networks
ICPADS '05 Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems - Volume 01
Spray computers: Explorations in self-organization
Pervasive and Mobile Computing
Certificate-based Access Control in Pure P2P Networks
P2P '06 Proceedings of the Sixth IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
Secure content access and replication in pure P2P networks
Computer Communications
Taxonomy of trust: Categorizing P2P reputation systems
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking - Management in peer-to-peer systems
Bayesian analysis of secure P2P sharing protocols
OTM'07 Proceedings of the 2007 OTM confederated international conference on On the move to meaningful internet systems: CoopIS, DOA, ODBASE, GADA, and IS - Volume Part II
A utility-based auction cooperation incentive mechanism in peer-to-peer networks
EUC'06 Proceedings of the 2006 international conference on Emerging Directions in Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing
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The goal of this paper is to present a formal framework specially defined for the analysis of cooperative behavior in self-organizing multi-party security protocols. To illustrate the formalism, we formally analyze a multi-party peer to peer (MP-P2P) content authentication protocol which ensures content integrity in a decentralized P2P file sharing system. Our approach, based on Game Theory, will serve to formally analyze and verify cooperation among a variable number of selfish and untrustworthy participant peers.