Incentives for Sharing in Peer-to-Peer Networks
WELCOM '01 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Electronic Commerce
An Incentive Mechanism for P2P Networks
ICDCS '04 Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS'04)
Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A game theoretic approach to provide incentive and service differentiation in P2P networks
Proceedings of the joint international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Practice and theory of incentives in networked systems
Incentive and service differentiation in P2P networks: a game theoretic approach
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Proportional response dynamics leads to market equilibrium
Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
LayerP2P: using layered video chunks in P2P live streaming
IEEE Transactions on Multimedia
P2P trading in social networks: the value of staying connected
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
P2P soft security: On evolutionary dynamics of P2P incentive mechanism
Computer Communications
Punishment or reward: it is a problem in anonymous, dynamic and autonomous networking environments
UIC'11 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Ubiquitous intelligence and computing
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Incentive mechanism for selfish nodes in wireless sensor networks based on evolutionary game
Computers & Mathematics with Applications
The Peer's Dilemma: A general framework to examine cooperation in pure peer-to-peer systems
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
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In order to stimulate cooperation among nodes in P2P systems, some form of incentive mechanism is necessary so as to encourage service contribution. Hence, designing and evaluating the stability, robustness and performance of incentive policies is extremely critical. In this paper, we propose a general mathematical framework to evaluate the stability and evolution of a family of shared history based incentive policies. To illustrate the utility of the framework, we present two incentive policies and show why one incentive policy can lead to a total system collapse while the other is stable and operates at the optimal point. One can use this mathematical framework to design and analyze various incentive policies and verify whether they match the design objectives of the underlying P2P systems.