JANUS: towards robust and malicious resilient routing in hybrid wireless networks
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Wireless security
Incentive and service differentiation in P2P networks: a game theoretic approach
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Automatic grid assembly by promoting collaboration in peer-to-peer grids
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
An incentive mechanism for message relaying in unstructured peer-to-peer systems
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Mathematical modeling of incentive policies in p2p systems
Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Economics of networked systems
Distributed resource allocation algorithms for peer-to-peer networks
Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools
Causally ordered delivery in a hierarchical group of peer processes
Computer Communications
An incentive mechanism for message relaying in unstructured peer-to-peer systems
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Grey-box mechanism design in peer-to-peer cooperative networking
ICUFN'09 Proceedings of the first international conference on Ubiquitous and future networks
A simple reputation model for BitTorrent-like incentives
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
A framework for distributed bandwidth allocation in peer-to-peer networks
Performance Evaluation
A round-based pricing scheme for maximizing service provider's revenue in P2PTV networks
IMSAA'09 Proceedings of the 3rd IEEE international conference on Internet multimedia services architecture and applications
Towards a more accurate availability evaluation in peer-to-peer storage systems
International Journal of High Performance Computing and Networking
A mathematical framework for analyzing adaptive incentive protocols in P2P networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
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The current peer-to-peer (P2P) information sharing paradigm does not provide incentive and service differentiation for users. Since there is no motivation to share information or resources, this leads to the "free-riding" and the "tragedy of the commons" problems. In this paper, we address how one can incorporate incentive into the P2P information sharing paradigm so as to encourage users to share information and resources. Our mechanism (or protocol) provides service differentiation to users with different contribution values and connection types. The mechanism also has some desirable properties: (1) conservation of cumulative contribution and social utility in the P2P community, (2) maximization of social utility if all requesting clients have the same contribution value, and (3) incentive-based resource distribution. The resource distribution algorithm and the contribution update algorithm are computationally efficient and can be easily implemented. Experimental results illustrate the efficiency and fairness of our algorithms.