Incentives for sharing in peer-to-peer networks
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Performance analysis of the CONFIDANT protocol
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
An Incentive Mechanism for P2P Networks
ICDCS '04 Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS'04)
Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A game theoretic approach to provide incentive and service differentiation in P2P networks
Proceedings of the joint international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Practice and theory of incentives in networked systems
SIGMETRICS '05 Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
SLACER: A Self-Organizing Protocol for Coordination in Peer-to-Peer Networks
IEEE Intelligent Systems
Incentive and service differentiation in P2P networks: a game theoretic approach
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Proportional response dynamics leads to market equilibrium
Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On designing collusion-resistant routing schemes for non-cooperative wireless ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the 13th annual ACM international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Incentive-compatible opportunistic routing for wireless networks
Proceedings of the 14th ACM international conference on Mobile computing and networking
A simple model for chunk-scheduling strategies in P2P streaming
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
An efficient incentive scheme with a distributed authority infrastructure in peer-to-peer networks
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
On incentivizing upload capacity in P2P-VoD systems: Design, analysis and evaluation
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
On the credit evolution of credit-based incentive protocols in wireless mesh networks
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Rating Protocols in Online Communities
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
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In peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, incentive protocol is used to encourage cooperation among end-nodes so as to deliver a scalable and robust service. However, the design and analysis of incentive protocols have been ad hoc and heuristic at best. The objective of this paper is to provide a simple yet general framework to analyze and design incentive protocols. We consider a class of incentive protocols that can learn and adapt to other end-nodes' strategies. Based on our analytical framework, one can evaluate the expected performance gain and, more importantly, the system robustness of a given incentive protocol. To illustrate the framework, we present two adaptive learning models and three incentive policies and show the conditions in which the P2P networks may collapse and the conditions in which the P2P networks can guarantee a high degree of cooperation. We also show the connection between evaluating incentive protocol and evolutionary game theory so one can easily identify robustness characteristics of a given policy. Using our framework, one can gain the understanding on the price of altruism and system stability, as well as the correctness of the adaptive incentive policy.