Communications of the ACM
Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Collaboration of untrusting peers with changing interests
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Reputation Mechanism Design in Online Trading Environments with Pure Moral Hazard
Information Systems Research
Using mobile relays to prolong the lifetime of wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the 11th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Incentive mechanisms for large collaborative resource sharing
CCGRID '04 Proceedings of the 2004 IEEE International Symposium on Cluster Computing and the Grid
Optimal pricing with recommender systems
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Incentive and service differentiation in P2P networks: a game theoretic approach
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Research Note---How Often Should Reputation Mechanisms Update a Trader's Reputation Profile?
Information Systems Research
Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method
Management Science
I tube, you tube, everybody tubes: analyzing the world's largest user generated content video system
Proceedings of the 7th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
Knowledge sharing and yahoo answers: everyone knows something
Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 1
Cooperation in Evolving Social Networks
Management Science
Medium access control protocols with memory
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Service differentiated peer selection: an incentive mechanism for peer-to-peer media streaming
IEEE Transactions on Multimedia
Pricing congestible network resources
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
A mathematical framework for analyzing adaptive incentive protocols in P2P networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
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Sustaining cooperation among self-interested agents is critical for the proliferation of emerging online communities. Providing incentives for cooperation in online communities is particularly challenging because of their unique features: a large population of anonymous agents having asymmetric interests and dynamically joining and leaving the community, operation errors, and agents trying to whitewash when they have a low standing in the community. In this article, we take these features into consideration and propose a framework for designing and analyzing a class of incentive schemes based on rating protocols, which consist of a rating scheme and a recommended strategy. We first define the concept of sustainable rating protocols under which every agent has the incentive to follow the recommended strategy given the deployed rating scheme. We then formulate the problem of designing an optimal rating protocol, which selects the protocol that maximizes the overall social welfare among all sustainable rating protocols. Using the proposed framework, we study the structure of optimal rating protocols and explore the impact of one-sided rating, punishment lengths, and whitewashing on optimal rating protocols. Our results show that optimal rating protocols are capable of sustaining cooperation, with the amount of cooperation varying depending on the community characteristics.