Selfish Grids: Game-Theoretic Modeling and NAS/PSA Benchmark Evaluation
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Studying Viable Free Markets in Peer-to-Peer File Exchange Applications without Altruistic Agents
Agents and Peer-to-Peer Computing
How does user heterogeneity affect performance of P2P caching?: evolutionary game theoretic approach
Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Bio-Inspired Models of Network, Information and Computing Sytems
Trading Paper Clips --An Analysis of “Trading Up” in Artificial Societies without Altruists
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on Artificial Intelligence Research and Development: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference of the Catalan Association for Artificial Intelligence
Efficient Grid Task-Bundle Allocation Using Bargaining Based Self-Adaptive Auction
CCGRID '09 Proceedings of the 2009 9th IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Cluster Computing and the Grid
Cooperative power-aware scheduling in grid computing environments
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
A game-theoretic method of fair resource allocation for cloud computing services
The Journal of Supercomputing
A decision-analytic approach for P2P cooperation policy setting
Proceedings of the 2010 Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation
Coordination of cooperation policies in a peer-to-peer system using swarm-based RL
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
Handling free riders in peer-to-peer systems
AP2PC'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Agents and Peer-to-Peer Computing
Peer-to-Peer multimedia sharing based on social norms
Image Communication
Rating Protocols in Online Communities
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
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We study the nature of sharing resources in distributed collaborations such as Grids and peer-to-peer systems. By applying the theoretical framework of the multi-person prisoner's dilemma to this resource sharing problem, we show that in the absence of incentive schemes, individual users are apt to hold back resources, leading to decreased system utility. Using both the theoretical framework as well as simulations, we compare and contrast three different incentive schemes aimed at encouraging users to contribute resources. Our results show that soft-incentive schemes are effective in incentivizing autonomous entities to collaborate, leading to increased gains for all participants in the system.