Selfish caching in distributed systems: a game-theoretic analysis
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Incentive mechanisms for large collaborative resource sharing
CCGRID '04 Proceedings of the 2004 IEEE International Symposium on Cluster Computing and the Grid
SLACER: A Self-Organizing Protocol for Coordination in Peer-to-Peer Networks
IEEE Intelligent Systems
Incentivizing the global wireless village
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
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Ubiquitous information societies enables us to freely obtain information anytime and anywhere. Beyond this concept, achievement of ambient information societies has been expected in recent years, in which we can retrieve desired information in accordance with current conditions of surrounding environments. In this paper, we focus on Peer-to-Peer (P2P) file sharing systems as an example of such ambient information sharing systems. We try to figure out the system performance when all users behave selfishly and autonomously according to their surrounding situations. In P2P file sharing systems, file availability is improved by users cooperatively caching and sharing files. However, many users may hesitate to cache files cooperatively due to the cost for caching, such as storage consumption, processing load, and bandwidth consumption. In such a case, unpopular files are likely to disappear from the system. In this paper, we reveal how the selfish user behavior affects the system performance using evolutionary game theoretic approach. Specifically, we focus on situations where users are heterogeneous in terms of aggressiveness in cooperative caching. Analytical results show that the user heterogeneity contributes to the stability of file availability.