Managing trust in a peer-2-peer information system
Proceedings of the tenth international conference on Information and knowledge management
Choosing reputable servents in a P2P network
Proceedings of the 11th international conference on World Wide Web
The Eigentrust algorithm for reputation management in P2P networks
WWW '03 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on World Wide Web
A reputation system for peer-to-peer networks
NOSSDAV '03 Proceedings of the 13th international workshop on Network and operating systems support for digital audio and video
Measurement, modeling, and analysis of a peer-to-peer file-sharing workload
SOSP '03 Proceedings of the nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Incentive mechanisms for large collaborative resource sharing
CCGRID '04 Proceedings of the 2004 IEEE International Symposium on Cluster Computing and the Grid
Effective use of reputation in peer-to-peer environments
CCGRID '04 Proceedings of the 2004 IEEE International Symposium on Cluster Computing and the Grid
Peer-to-peer's most wanted: Malicious peers
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking - Management in peer-to-peer systems
COINS: COalitions and INcentiveS for effective Peer-to-Peer downloads
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
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In reputation-based peer-to-peer systems, reputation is used to build trust between peers and help selecting the right peers to download from. In this paper, we argue that reputation should not be used for service differentiation among the peers. To provide the right incentives for peers to share files and contribute to the system, the new concept of Contribution Behavior is introduced for partially decentralized peer-to-peer systems. Service differentiation is achieved based on the Contribution Behavior of the peers rather than their reputations. Simulation results assess the ability of the proposed algorithm to effectively identify free riders and malicious peers that upload malicious content, hence reducing the level of service provided to these peers and preserving network resources. On the other hand, good peers that contribute to the system receive better services which increases their satisfaction significantly.