Incentives for Sharing in Peer-to-Peer Networks
WELCOM '01 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Electronic Commerce
The Eigentrust algorithm for reputation management in P2P networks
WWW '03 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on World Wide Web
Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Comparing economic incentives in peer-to-peer networks
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking - Special issue: Internet economics: Pricing and policies
Incentive mechanisms for large collaborative resource sharing
CCGRID '04 Proceedings of the 2004 IEEE International Symposium on Cluster Computing and the Grid
GnuStream: a P2P media streaming system prototype
ICME '03 Proceedings of the 2003 International Conference on Multimedia and Expo - Volume 1
Operating system support for planetary-scale network services
NSDI'04 Proceedings of the 1st conference on Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation - Volume 1
STORM: A Secure Overlay for P2P Reputation Management
SASO '07 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Self-Adaptive and Self-Organizing Systems
One hop reputations for peer to peer file sharing workloads
NSDI'08 Proceedings of the 5th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Opportunistic flooding in low-duty-cycle wireless sensor networks with unreliable links
Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Incentive cooperation strategies for peer-to-peer live multimedia streaming social networks
IEEE Transactions on Multimedia - Special section on communities and media computing
A systematic framework for dynamically optimizing multi-user wireless video transmission
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Chainsaw: eliminating trees from overlay multicast
IPTPS'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Peer-to-Peer Systems
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Designing incentive schemes for Peer-to-Peer (P2P) multimedia sharing applications, where the participating peers find it in their self-interest to contribute resources rather than to ''free-ride'', is challenging due to the unique features exhibited by such networks: large populations of anonymous peers interacting infrequently, asymmetric interests of peers, network errors, multiple concurrent transactions, low-cost implementation requirements, etc. In this paper, to address these challenges, we design and rigorously analyze a new family of incentive protocols that utilizes social norms. In the proposed protocols, each peer maintains a reputation reflecting its past behaviors in the P2P system (i.e. whether the peers have followed or not the social strategy prescribed by the social norm), and the social norm rewards and punishes peers depending on their reputations. We first define the concept of a sustainable social norm, under which no peer has an incentive to deviate from the social strategy prescribed by the protocol. We then formulate the problem of designing optimal social norms, which selects the social norm that maximizes the network performance among all sustainable social norms. In particular, we prove that, given the P2P network and peers' characteristics, social norms can be designed such that it becomes in the self-interest of peers to contribute their contents to the network rather than to free-ride. We also investigate the impact of various punishment schemes on the social welfare as well as how should the optimal social norms be designed if altruistic and malicious peers are active in the network. Our results show that optimal social norms are capable of deterring free-riding behaviors and providing significant improvements in the sharing efficiency of multimedia P2P networks.