Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Search and replication in unstructured peer-to-peer networks
ICS '02 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Supercomputing
CT-RSA '02 Proceedings of the The Cryptographer's Track at the RSA Conference on Topics in Cryptology
Incentives for Sharing in Peer-to-Peer Networks
WELCOM '01 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Electronic Commerce
Routing Indices For Peer-to-Peer Systems
ICDCS '02 Proceedings of the 22 nd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS'02)
Improving Search in Peer-to-Peer Networks
ICDCS '02 Proceedings of the 22 nd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS'02)
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
PPay: micropayments for peer-to-peer systems
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
An Incentive Mechanism for P2P Networks
ICDCS '04 Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS'04)
SLIC: A Selfish Link-Based Incentive Mechanism for Unstructured Peer-to-Peer Networks
ICDCS '04 Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS'04)
Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A case for taxation in peer-to-peer streaming broadcast
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Practice and theory of incentives in networked systems
Hidden-action in multi-hop routing
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Non-Cooperation in Competitive P2P Networks
ICDCS '05 Proceedings of the 25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Free Riding on Gnutella Revisited: The Bell Tolls?
IEEE Distributed Systems Online
Incentives to Promote Availability in Peer-to-Peer Anonymity Systems
ICNP '05 Proceedings of the 13TH IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
An analytical framework for evaluating peer-to-peer business models
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
P2P commercial digital content exchange
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Service differentiated peer selection: an incentive mechanism for peer-to-peer media streaming
IEEE Transactions on Multimedia
Self-organized routing for wireless microsensor networks
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part A: Systems and Humans
Reward mechanisms for P2P VoIP networks
Information Technology and Management
Cooperating with free riders in unstructured P2P networks
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Peer-to-Peer Information Retrieval: An Overview
ACM Transactions on Information Systems (TOIS)
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Distributed message relaying is an important function of a peer-to-peer system to discover service providers. Existing search protocols in unstructured peer-to-peer systems create huge burden on communications, cause long response time, or result in unreliable performance. Moreover, with self-interested peers, these systems are vulnerable to the free-riding problem. In this paper we present an incentive mechanism that not only mitigates the free-riding problem, but also achieves good system efficiency in message relaying for peer discovery. In this mechanism promised rewards are passed along the message propagation process. A peer is rewarded if a service provider is found via a relaying path that includes this peer. The mechanism allows peers to rationally trade-off communication efficiency and reliability while maintaining information locality. We provide some analytic insights to the symmetric Nash equilibrium strategies of this game, and an approximate approach to calculate this equilibrium. Experiments show that this incentive mechanism brings a system utility generally higher than breadth-first search and random walks, based on both the estimated utility from our approximate equilibrium and the utility generated from learning in the incentive mechanism.