An incentive mechanism for message relaying in unstructured peer-to-peer systems
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
MuON: Epidemic based mutual anonymity in unstructured P2P networks
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
A Fair Utility Function for Incentive Mechanism against Free-Riding in Peer-to-Peer Networks
NEW2AN '08 / ruSMART '08 Proceedings of the 8th international conference, NEW2AN and 1st Russian Conference on Smart Spaces, ruSMART on Next Generation Teletraffic and Wired/Wireless Advanced Networking
Enforcing behaviour with anonymity
Proceedings of the workshop on Applications of private and anonymous communications
An incentive mechanism for message relaying in unstructured peer-to-peer systems
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Remuneration aware resource acquisition in p2p overlay
CCNC'09 Proceedings of the 6th IEEE Conference on Consumer Communications and Networking Conference
Cooperating with free riders in unstructured P2P networks
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Capitalizing on free riders in p2p networks
Euro-Par'07 Proceedings of the 13th international Euro-Par conference on Parallel Processing
Resource Acquisition from Set-Top-Boxes for Service Provision
International Journal of Information Systems in the Service Sector
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Peer-to-peer (P2P) anonymous communication systems are vulnerable to free-riders, peers that use the system while providing little or no service to others and whose presence limits the strength of anonymity as well as the ef- ficiency of the system. Free-riding can be addressed by building explicit incentive mechanisms into system protocols to promote two distinct aspects of cooperation among peers - compliance with the protocol specification and the availability of peers to serve others. In this paper we study the use of payments to implement an incentive mechanism that attaches a real monetary cost to low availability. Through a game theoretic analysis, we evaluate the effectiveness of such an incentive, finding that peer availability can be significantly increased through the introduction of payments under many conditions. We also demonstrate how a payment-based incentive that preserves anonymity can be implemented and integrated with a popular class of P2P anonymity systems.