The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Anonymizing Censorship Resistant Systems
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
The Cocaine Auction Protocol: On the Power of Anonymous Broadcast
IH '99 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Information Hiding
BOINC: A System for Public-Resource Computing and Storage
GRID '04 Proceedings of the 5th IEEE/ACM International Workshop on Grid Computing
Incentives to Promote Availability in Peer-to-Peer Anonymity Systems
ICNP '05 Proceedings of the 13TH IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
The pynchon gate: a secure method of pseudonymous mail retrieval
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Suicide for the common good: a new strategy for credential revocation in self-organizing systems
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Coercion-Resistance and Receipt-Freeness in Electronic Voting
CSFW '06 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Publius: a robust, tamper-evident, censorship-resistant web publishing system
SSYM'00 Proceedings of the 9th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 9
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Do incentives build robustness in bit torrent
NSDI'07 Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on Networked systems design & implementation
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We discuss applications of an underlying anonymous infrastructure to enforce fair behaviour on participants in a distributed resource-sharing system. This approach aims to prevent users from forming self-rewarding cliques in order to gain unfair advantages in the use of shared resources. We deliberately avoid considering the more traditional applications of anonymous systems in an attempt to show the potential for the use of restricted access to identifying user information in applications where privacy is not the main motivation. We also briefly explore the problem of enforcing anonymity on users who may not wish to be anonymous, and consider the effect that low-level identification may have on the overall behaviour that we seek to enforce.