A game theoretic approach to provide incentive and service differentiation in P2P networks
Proceedings of the joint international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
A Distributed and Measurement-Based Framework against Free Riding in Peer-to-Peer Networks
P2P '04 Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
A survey of peer-to-peer content distribution technologies
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Incentives to Promote Availability in Peer-to-Peer Anonymity Systems
ICNP '05 Proceedings of the 13TH IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
Incentives for P2P Fair Resource Sharing
P2P '05 Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
P2P Incentive Mechanism for File Sharing and Cooperation
ICCSA '09 Proceedings of the International Conference on Computational Science and Its Applications: Part I
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There are two problems, unfair and too strict, with the utility function of the proposed incentive mechanisms for restraining the free-riding in peer-to-peer (P2P) networks. This paper is devoted to establish a new fair utility function to solve those problems. We absorb both the absolute contribution value and the physical performance of peers in our utility function and the absolute contribution value is divided into supply value and profit value. Besides, we take the time the user is in the system as a factor of a peer's utility. The mathematical modeling, Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), is used in this paper to construct the function. The simulations compare the fair utility function with the proposed three functions and the results verify that this function is effective to solve those two problems.