A reputation-based approach for choosing reliable resources in peer-to-peer networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The Eigentrust algorithm for reputation management in P2P networks
WWW '03 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on World Wide Web
PPay: micropayments for peer-to-peer systems
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Counteracting free riding in Peer-to-Peer networks
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
A Fair Utility Function for Incentive Mechanism against Free-Riding in Peer-to-Peer Networks
NEW2AN '08 / ruSMART '08 Proceedings of the 8th international conference, NEW2AN and 1st Russian Conference on Smart Spaces, ruSMART on Next Generation Teletraffic and Wired/Wireless Advanced Networking
Off-Line karma: a decentralized currency for peer-to-peer and grid applications
ACNS'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
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P2P (Peer-to-Peer) network allows peers to distribute and obtain a file to be shared cooperatively. However, some peers only download files without cooperation. Peers also share low quality files or unpopular files. These selfish behavior of peers is referred to "free riding". The free riding of peer may decrease the participation of other peers or the system performance. In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism, called P2PIncentive, which provides the correct use of incentive mechanism by using trust peers, computes contribution values referring behavior of peers and rewards peers. The proposed mechanism assigns bandwidth and TTL (Time-To-Live) to a peer according to the contribution and differentiates the use of service. A case study on simulations shows the service differentiation according to the behavior of peers, the correct use of incentive mechanism and the advantages by use of trust peers. To prove the stability of proposed mechanism, we also show the disadvantage that a peer receives from the incorrect use of incentive mechanism.