A Security and Performance Evaluation of Hash-Based RFID Protocols
Information Security and Cryptology
On the Untraceability of Anonymous RFID Authentication Protocol with Constant Key-Lookup
ICISS '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Information Systems Security
Security analysis and complexity comparison of some recent lightweight RFID protocols
CISIS'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Computational intelligence in security for information systems
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
In this paper, we propose two RFID identification and authentication schemes based on the previously proposed Triggered Hash Chain scheme by Henrici and Muller [1]. The schemes are designed to mitigate the shortcomings observed in the Triggered Hash Chain scheme and to ensure privacy preserving identification, tag-reader mutual authentication, as well as forward-privacy in the case of RFID tags that have been compromised. The first scheme uses a challenge-response mechanism to defend against an obvious weakness of the Triggered Hash Chain scheme. The second scheme uses an authenticated monotonic counter to defend against a session linking attack that the first scheme is vulnerable to. We compare the level of security offered by our proposed schemes against other previous schemes and find that the schemes perform well, while keeping within reasonable overheads in terms of computational, storage and communication requirements.