Privacy and security in library RFID: issues, practices, and architectures
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A Scalable and Provably Secure Hash-Based RFID Protocol
PERCOMW '05 Proceedings of the Third IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops
RFID security without extensive cryptography
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
YA-TRAP: Yet Another Trivial RFID Authentication Protocol
PERCOMW '06 Proceedings of the 4th annual IEEE international conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops
A Secure and Efficient RFID Protocol that could make Big Brother (partially) Obsolete
PERCOM '06 Proceedings of the Fourth Annual IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications
A Lightweight RFID Protocol to protect against Traceability and Cloning attacks
SECURECOMM '05 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks
Mutual authentication protocol for RFID conforming to EPC Class 1 Generation 2 standards
Computer Standards & Interfaces
Dynamic Key-Updating: Privacy-Preserving Authentication for RFID Systems
PERCOM '07 Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications
RIPP-FS: An RFID Identification, Privacy Preserving Protocol with Forward Secrecy.
PERCOMW '07 Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops
Providing Security and Privacy in RFID Systems Using Triggered Hash Chains
PERCOM '08 Proceedings of the 2008 Sixth Annual IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications
Secure RFID Identification and Authentication with Triggered Hash Chain Variants
ICPADS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 14th IEEE International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems
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In this paper, we perform a security and performance evaluation on the various hash-based RFID identification and authentication protocols that have been proposed in the research literature. We compare the level of security offered by each of the schemes by examining whether they satisfy a set of security properties under a multi-level adversarial model. The security properties examined include tag anonymity, tag authenticity, reader authenticity, session unlinkability, forward secrecy, and desynchronization resilience. Furthermore, we also evaluate the performance of the schemes by examining the overhead, namely computational costs, storage memory requirements, and communication costs, incurred under the schemes. Finally, we provide a discussion on the insights gathered from our evaluation.