Improving the security, transparency and efficiency of California's 1% manual tally procedures

Authors:
Joseph Lorenzo Hall
Affiliations:
UC Berkeley School of Information
Venue:
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
Year:
2008

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Abstract

California jurisdictions have an extensive history of conducting post-election manual tallies of ballot records; they have performed this type audit since the 1960s when the use of lever and puchcard voting technologies became common statewide. We report findings from studying manual tally procedures in a handful of California counties. Through a cambination of iterative procedure development and observation of manual tally activities, we designed new procedures that better promote security, transparency and efficiency. We have since generalized these procedures for use in any Cali fornia county.