Machine-assisted election auditing
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
On auditing elections when precincts have different sizes
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
Improving the security, transparency and efficiency of California's 1% manual tally procedures
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
CAST: Canvass audits by sampling and testing
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
Risk-limiting postelection audits: conservative P-values from common probability inequalities
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
CAST: Canvass audits by sampling and testing
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
Election audits using a trinomial bound
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
Risk-limiting postelection audits: conservative P-values from common probability inequalities
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
Efficient user-guided ballot image verification
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Modeling and analyzing faults to improve election process robustness
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Super-simple simultaneous single-ballot risk-limiting audits
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Estimating the margin of victory for instant-runoff voting
EVT/WOTE'11 Proceedings of the 2011 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Applying a reusable election threat model at the county level
EVT/WOTE'11 Proceedings of the 2011 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
SOBA: secrecy-preserving observable ballot-level audit
EVT/WOTE'11 Proceedings of the 2011 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Operator-assisted tabulation of optical scan ballots
EVT/WOTE'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
BRAVO: ballot-polling risk-limiting audits to verify outcomes
EVT/WOTE'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
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Risk-limiting postelection audits limit the chance of certifying an electoral outcome if the outcome is not what a full hand count would show. Building on previous work [18, 17, 20, 21, 11], we report pilot risk-limiting audits in four elections during 2008 in three California counties: one during the February 2008 Primary Election in Marin County and three during the November 2008 General Elections in Marin, Santa Cruz and Yolo Counties. We explain what makes an audit risk-limiting and how existing and proposed laws fall short. We discuss the differences among our four pilot audits. We identify challenges to practical, efficient risk-limiting audits and conclude that current approaches are too complex to be used routinely on a large scale. One important logistical bottleneck is the difficulty of exporting data from commercial election management systems in a format amenable to audit calculations. Finally, we propose a barebones risk-limiting audit that is less efficient than these pilot audits, but avoids many practical problems.