On auditing elections when precincts have different sizes
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
Election audits using a trinomial bound
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
Risk-limiting postelection audits: conservative P-values from common probability inequalities
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
Implementing risk-limiting post-election audits in California
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Election audits using a trinomial bound
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
Risk-limiting postelection audits: conservative P-values from common probability inequalities
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
Implementing risk-limiting post-election audits in California
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Super-simple simultaneous single-ballot risk-limiting audits
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Single-ballot risk-limiting audits using convex optimization
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
SOBA: secrecy-preserving observable ballot-level audit
EVT/WOTE'11 Proceedings of the 2011 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
A Bayesian method for auditing elections
EVT/WOTE'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
BRAVO: ballot-polling risk-limiting audits to verify outcomes
EVT/WOTE'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
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Canvass Audit by Sampling and Testing (CAST) is a method to decide on the basis of a hand count of a random sample of batches of ballots whether to count the entire audit trail of a contest by hand. Data are collected in stages. At stage s, one computes Ps, an upper bound on the P-value of the hypothesis that the apparent outcome is wrong, conditional on the results of previous audit stages. If Ps is less than a threshold αs--strong evidence that the apparent outcome is correct--the audit stops. Otherwise, the audit advances to stage s+1. If the audit has not stopped by stage s = S, there is a full hand count. The thresholds {αs}s=1S are chosen to guarantee that whenever the apparent outcome is wrong, the chance of a full hand count is at least 1 - α: The risk of certifying an incorrect outcome is at most α. Conditioning allows deliberate selection of some batches of ballots for audit. CAST can use any sampling and testing scheme for which upper bounds on conditional P-values can be calculated. A turn-key implementation for proportionally stratified random samples is given, using the maximum relative overstatement of pairwise margins as the test statistic. This implementation works with contests that cross jurisdictional boundaries and contests that allow voters to select more than one candidate.