Bridging the gap: software specification meets intrusion detector

  • Authors:
  • Mathew Graves;Mohammad Zulkernine

  • Affiliations:
  • Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada;Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 2006 International Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust: Bridge the Gap Between PST Technologies and Business Services
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

There exist a number of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) that detect computer attacks based on some defined attack scenarios. The attack scenarios or security requirements in some of these IDSs are specified in attack specification languages which are separate from software specification languages. The use of two different languages for software specification and attack specification may generate redundant and conflicting requirements. The advantage of using the same language for both functional specifications and attacks specifications is that software designers can address the two different issues without learning the two types of languages. We present a method of using a software specification language called Abstract State Machine Language (AsmL) as an attack specification language for the open source IDS Snort. This work provides AsmL users an IDS that they can use without knowing how to write Snort rules. We automatically translate attack scenarios written in AsmL into Snort rules with context information. The original Snort is modified so that it can use the rules automatically generated by the translator. Adding context information to Snort rules improves the detection capability of Snort. To show the efficacy of our presented approach, we have built a prototype and evaluated it using a number of well-known attack scenarios.