Dual Payoffs, Core and a Collaboration Mechanism Based on Capacity Exchange Prices in Multicommodity Flow Games

Authors:
Luyi Gui;Özlem Ergun
Affiliations:
H. Milton Stewart School of Industrial and System Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, USA GA 30332;H. Milton Stewart School of Industrial and System Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, USA GA 30332
Venue:
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Year:
2008

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Abstract

Given a network in which the edge capacities and the commodities are owned by the players, a cooperative multicommodity flow (MCF) game (N ,v ) can be defined such that v (S ), the value of a sub-coalition S , is the maximum profit achievable within S by shipping its commodities through the sub-network owned by its members. In this paper, we study MCF games under a partially decentralized setting where the players make their own routing and resource exchange decisions given a set of capacity prices determined by a central authority.