A generalized linear production model: A unifying model
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts
Mathematics of Operations Research
On the complexity of testing membership in the core of min-cost spanning tree games
International Journal of Game Theory
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Combinatorial optimization games
SODA '97 Proceedings of the eighth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Optimization flow control—I: basic algorithm and convergence
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Cooperative facility location games
SODA '00 Proceedings of the eleventh annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximation algorithms
Lectures on modern convex optimization: analysis, algorithms, and engineering applications
Lectures on modern convex optimization: analysis, algorithms, and engineering applications
Distributed algorithmic mechanism design: recent results and future directions
DIALM '02 Proceedings of the 6th international workshop on Discrete algorithms and methods for mobile computing and communications
A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
Proceedings of the twenty-first annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Market Equilibrium via a Primal-Dual-Type Algorithm
FOCS '02 Proceedings of the 43rd Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
On-Line End-to-End Congestion Control
FOCS '02 Proceedings of the 43rd Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Fundamental design issues for the future Internet
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Cooperative profit sharing in coalition-based resource allocation in wireless networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Coalition formation based on marginal contributions and the Markov process
Decision Support Systems
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In the work of Papadimitriou [C.H. Papadimitriou, Algorithms, games, and the internet. In Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing (2001) pp. 749-753], he proposed a game theoretic framework for analyzing incentive issues in Internet routing. In particular, he defined the following coalitional game: Given a network with a multicommodity flow satisfying node capacity and demand constraints, the payoff of a node is the total flow originated or terminated at it. A payoff allocation is in the core of the game if and only if there is no subset of nodes that can increase their payoff by seceding from the network. We answer one of the open problems in the work of Papadimitriou [C.H. Papadimitriou, Algorithms, games, and the internet. In Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing (2001) pp. 749-753] by proving that for any network, the core is non-empty in both the transferable (where the nodes can compensate each other with side payments) and the non-transferable case. In the transferable case, we show that such an allocation can be computed in polynomial time. We also generalize this result to the case where a strictly concave utility function is associated with each commodity.