The communication complexity of uncoupled nash equilibrium procedures
Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On the structure of weakly acyclic games
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Convergence to equilibrium of logit dynamics for strategic games
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Multiagent learning in large anonymous games
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Best-response dynamics out of sync: complexity and characterization
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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In many real-world settings (e.g., interdomain routing in the Internet) strategic agents are instructed to follow best-reply dynamics in asynchronous environments. In such settings players learn of each other's actions via update messages that can be delayed or even lost. In particular, several players might update their actions simultaneously , or make choices based on outdated information. In this paper we analyze the convergence of best- (and better-)reply dynamics in asynchronous environments. We provide sufficient conditions, and necessary conditions for convergence in such settings, and also study the convergence-rate of these natural dynamics.