Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing
SIAM Journal on Computing
Secret Handshakes from Pairing-Based Key Agreements
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A One Round Protocol for Tripartite Diffie–Hellman
Journal of Cryptology
Short Signatures from the Weil Pairing
Journal of Cryptology
RFID Privacy: An Overview of Problems and Proposed Solutions
IEEE Security and Privacy
Proxy re-signatures: new definitions, algorithms, and applications
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Improved proxy re-encryption schemes with applications to secure distributed storage
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Privacy threats and issues in mobile RFID
ARES '06 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security
Proof of concept of an RFID-enabled supply chain in a B2B e-commerce environment
ICEC '06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Electronic commerce: The new e-commerce: innovations for conquering current barriers, obstacles and limitations to conducting successful business on the internet
Defining Strong Privacy for RFID
PERCOMW '07 Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops
Chosen-ciphertext secure proxy re-encryption
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Enhancing information flow in a retail supply chain using RFID and the EPC network
Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research
A Survey of RFID Authentication Protocols
AINAW '08 Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications - Workshops
RFID in the supply chain: panacea or Pandora's box?
Communications of the ACM
Unidirectional key distribution across time and space with applications to RFID security
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
Efficient identity-based encryption without random oracles
EUROCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Public traceability in traitor tracing schemes
EUROCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
RFID security and privacy: a research survey
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
An access control model for mobile physical objects
Proceedings of the 15th ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
Physical-layer identification of RFID devices
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
Physical-layer identification of UHF RFID tags
Proceedings of the sixteenth annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Securely disseminating RFID events
Proceedings of the 5th ACM international conference on Distributed event-based system
Encryption-enforced access control for an RFID discovery service
Proceedings of the 17th ACM symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies
Fast cloned-tag identification protocols for large-scale RFID systems
Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE 20th International Workshop on Quality of Service
An information-flow type-system for mixed protocol secure computation
Proceedings of the 8th ACM SIGSAC symposium on Information, computer and communications security
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The growing use of RFID in supply chains brings along an indisputable added value from the business perspective, but raises a number of new interesting security challenges. One of them is the authentication of two participants of the supply chain that have possessed the same tagged item, but that have otherwise never communicated before. The situation is even more complex if we imagine that participants to the supply chain may be business competitors. We present a novel cryptographic scheme that solves this problem. In our solution, users exchange tags over the cycle of a supply chain and, if two entities have possessed the same tag, they agree on a secret common key they can use to protect their exchange of business sensitive information. No rogue user can be successful in a malicious authentication, because it would either be traceable or it would imply the loss of a secret key, which provides a strong incentive to keep the tag authentication information secret and protects the integrity of the supply chain. We provide game-based security proofs of our claims, without relying on the random oracle model.