An information-flow type-system for mixed protocol secure computation

  • Authors:
  • Florian Kerschbaum

  • Affiliations:
  • SAP Applied Research, Karlsruhe, Germany

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 8th ACM SIGSAC symposium on Information, computer and communications security
  • Year:
  • 2013

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Abstract

There are a number of domain-specific programming languages for secure computation. Out of those, the ones that are based on generic programming languages support mixing different protocol primitives and enable implementing a wider, possibly more efficient range of protocols. On the one hand, this may result in better protocol performance. On the other hand, this may lead to insecure protocols. In this paper we present a security type system that enables mixing protocol primitives in a generic programming language, but also ensures that well-typed programs are secure in the semi-honest model. Consequently, a compiled protocol must be secure. We show an extension of the L1 language with our security type system and evaluate the implementation of two protocols from the literature. This shows that our type system supports the provably secure implementation even of complex protocols.