Mechanized information flow analysis through inductive assertions

Authors:
Warren A. Hunt, Jr.;Robert Bellarmine Krug;Sandip Ray;William D. Young
Affiliations:
University of Texas at Austin;University of Texas at Austin;University of Texas at Austin;University of Texas at Austin
Venue:
Proceedings of the 2008 International Conference on Formal Methods in Computer-Aided Design
Year:
2008

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Abstract

We present a method for verifying information flow properties of software programs using inductive assertions and theorem proving. Given a program annotated with information flow assertions at cutpoints, the method uses a theorem prover and operational semantics to generate and discharge verification conditions. This obviates the need to develop a verification condition generator (VCG) or a customized logic for information flow properties. The method is compositional: a subroutine needs to be analyzed once, rather than at each call site. The method is being mechanized in the ACL2 theorem prover, and we discuss initial results demonstrating its applicability.