How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
Optimistic protocols for fair exchange
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Public key signatures in the multi-user setting
Information Processing Letters
Non-Malleable Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge and Adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext Security
FOCS '99 Proceedings of the 40th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Breaking and repairing optimistic fair exchange from PODC 2003
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Digital rights management
Public-key encryption in a multi-user setting: security proofs and improvements
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Optimistic fair exchange in a multi-user setting
PKC'07 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Practice and theory in public-key cryptography
Stand-Alone and setup-free verifiably committed signatures
CT-RSA'06 Proceedings of the 2006 The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA conference on Topics in Cryptology
More on stand-alone and setup-free verifiably committed signatures
ACISP'06 Proceedings of the 11th Australasian conference on Information Security and Privacy
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A fair exchange scheme is a protocol by which two parties Alice and Bob swap items or services without allowing either party to gain an advantage by quitting prematurely or otherwise misbehaving. Verifiably committed signature is a generalized and unified model for non-interactive optimistic fair exchange scheme. The state-of-the-art verifiably committed signature that enjoys the off-line, setup-free and stand-alone properties is due to Zhu and Bao [1]. In this article, we show that the Zhu-Bao's verifiably committed signature is insecure in the multi-user setting and then consider possible countermeasures.