Public key signatures in the multi-user setting

Authors:
S. Galbraith;J. Malone-Lee;N. P. Smart
Affiliations:
Department of Mathematics, Royal Holloway College, University of London, Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX, UK;Department of Computer Science, University of Bristol, Merchant Venturers Building, Woodland Road, Bristol, BS8 1UB, UK;Department of Computer Science, University of Bristol, Merchant Venturers Building, Woodland Road, Bristol, BS8 1UB, UK
Venue:
Information Processing Letters
Year:
2002

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Abstract

This paper addresses the security of public key signature schemes in a "multi-user" setting. We bound the advantage of an adversary in producing an existential forgery on any one of a set of target public keys by the advantage of an adversary in producing an existential forgery on a single public key for any public key signature algorithm. We then improve the concrete security of this general reduction for certain specific discrete logarithm based signature algorithms such as that of Schnorr.