How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
Signature schemes based on the strong RSA assumption
CCS '99 Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
CT-RSA '02 Proceedings of the The Cryptographer's Track at the RSA Conference on Topics in Cryptology
ICISC '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference Seoul on Information Security and Cryptology
Cryptographically Strong Undeniable Signatures, Unconditionally Secure for the Signer
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
The exact security of digital signatures-how to sign with RSA and Rabin
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
A sanitizable signature scheme with aggregation
ISPEC'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Information security practice and experience
Aggregate and verifiably encrypted signatures from bilinear maps
EUROCRYPT'03 Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques
Invisibility and anonymity of undeniable and confirmer signatures
CT-RSA'03 Proceedings of the 2003 RSA conference on The cryptographers' track
On the key exposure problem in chameleon hashes
SCN'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security in Communication Networks
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
PIATS: a partially sanitizable signature scheme
ICICS'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information and Communications Security
Security of Sanitizable Signatures Revisited
Irvine Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: PKC '09
Trapdoor sanitizable signatures made easy
ACNS'10 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
Redactable signatures for tree-structured data: definitions and constructions
ACNS'10 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
Hierarchical identity-based chameleon hash and its applications
ACNS'11 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
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A digital signature does not allow any alteration of the document to which it is attached. Appropriate alteration of some signed documents, however, should be allowed because there are security requirements other than the integrity of the document. In the disclosure of official information, for example, sensitive information such as personal information or national secrets is masked when an official document is sanitized so that its nonsensitive information can be disclosed when it is requested by a citizen. If this disclosure is done digitally by using the current digital signature schemes, the citizen cannot verify the disclosed information because it has been altered to prevent the leakage of sensitive information. The confidentiality of official information is thus incompatible with the integrity of that information, and this is called the digital document sanitizing problem. Conventional solutions such as content extraction signatures and digitally signed document sanitizing schemes with disclosure condition control can either let the sanitizer assign disclosure conditions or hide the number of sanitized portions. The digitally signed document sanitizing scheme we propose here is based on the aggregate signature derived from bilinear maps and can do both. Moreover, the proposed scheme can sanitize a signed document invisibly, that is, no one can distinguish whether the signed document has been sanitized or not.