Redactable signatures for tree-structured data: definitions and constructions

  • Authors:
  • Christina Brzuska;Heike Busch;Oezguer Dagdelen;Marc Fischlin;Martin Franz;Stefan Katzenbeisser;Mark Manulis;Cristina Onete;Andreas Peter;Bertram Poettering;Dominique Schröder

  • Affiliations:
  • Technical University of Darmstadt, Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt;Technical University of Darmstadt, Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt;Technical University of Darmstadt, Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt;Technical University of Darmstadt, Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt;Technical University of Darmstadt, Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt;Technical University of Darmstadt, Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt;Technical University of Darmstadt, Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt;Technical University of Darmstadt, Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt;Technical University of Darmstadt, Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt;Technical University of Darmstadt, Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt;Technical University of Darmstadt, Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt

  • Venue:
  • ACNS'10 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

Kundu and Bertino (VLDB 2008) recently introduced the idea of structural signatures for trees which support public redaction of subtrees (by third-party distributors) while pertaining the integrity of the remaining parts. An example is given by signed XML documents of which parts should be sanitized before being published by a distributor not holding the signing key. Kundu and Bertino also provide a construction, but fall short of providing formal security definitions and proofs. Here we revisit their work and give rigorous security models for the redactable signatures for tree-structured data, relate the notions, and give a construction that can be proven secure under standard cryptographic assumptions.