Practical and Provably-Secure Commitment Schemes from Collision-Free Hashing
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
The complexity of XPath query evaluation
Proceedings of the twenty-second ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART symposium on Principles of database systems
Structural signatures for tree data structures
Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment
Security of Sanitizable Signatures Revisited
Irvine Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: PKC '09
ICWS '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Conference on Web Services
Redactable signatures for tree-structured data: definitions and constructions
ACNS'10 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
On the key exposure problem in chameleon hashes
SCN'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security in Communication Networks
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Extended sanitizable signatures
ICISC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
Redactable Signatures for Signed CDA Documents
Journal of Medical Systems
Redactable signatures for independent removal of structure and content
ISPEC'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security Practice and Experience
STM'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Security and Trust Management
On structural signatures for tree data structures
ACNS'12 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Hi-index | 0.00 |
We present the performance measures of our Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA) implementation that integrates sanitizable signature schemes into the XML Signature Specification. Our implementation shows mostly negligible performance impacts when using the Ateniese scheme with four different chameleon hashes and the Miyazaki scheme in XML Signatures. Thus, sanitizable signatures can be added to the XML Security Toolbox. Applying the new tools we show how to combine different hash algorithms over different document parts adding and removing certain properties of the sanitizable signature scheme; this mixing comes very natural in XML Signatures. Finally, we motivate that existing definitions for the property of Transparency are counterintuitive in these combinations. Our conclusion is that the document-level Transparency property is independent of the sub-document properties Weak and Strong Transparency.