A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
ICISC '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference Seoul on Information Security and Cryptology
Computer Security 2e
Network Security Essentials: Applications and Standards (3rd Edition)
Network Security Essentials: Applications and Standards (3rd Edition)
Security of Sanitizable Signatures Revisited
Irvine Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: PKC '09
Towards Automated Processing of the Right of Access in Inter-organizational Web Service Compositions
SERVICES '10 Proceedings of the 2010 6th World Congress on Services
Sanitizable sgnatures with srong tansparency in the sandard model
Inscrypt'09 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information security and cryptology
ACNS'11 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
Security and trust in the italian legal digital signature framework
iTrust'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Trust Management
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
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We analyse the legal requirements that digital signature schemes have to fulfil to achieve the Statutory Trust granted by the EU electronic signature laws ("legally equivalent to hand-written signatures"). Legally, we found that the possibility to detect subsequent changes is important for the Statutory Trust. However, detectability was neither adequately nor precisely enough defined in the technical and legal definitions of the term "Data Integrity". The existing definition on integrity lack a precise notion of which changes should not invalidate a corresponding digital signature and also lack notions to distinguish levels of detection. We give a new definition for Data Integrity including two notions: Authorized changes, these are changes which do not compromise the data's integrity; and their level of detection. Especially, the technical term "Transparency" introduced as a security property for sanitizable signature schemes has an opposite meaning in the legal context. Technically, cryptography can allow authorized changes and keep them unrecognisably hidden. Legally, keeping them invisible removes the Statutory Trust. This work shows how to gain the Statutory Trust for a chameleon hash based sanitizable signature scheme.