Attack on an ID-based authenticated group key agreement scheme from PKC 2004
Information Processing Letters
Modeling insider attacks on group key-exchange protocols
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
Scalable Protocols for Authenticated Group Key Exchange
Journal of Cryptology
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
COMPASS: authenticated group key agreement from signcryption
FPS'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Foundations and Practice of Security
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In 2004, Choi et al. proposed an ID-based authenticated group key agreement. Unfortunately, their protocol was found to be vulnerable to the insider attacks by Zhang, Chen and Shim. To prevent insider attacks, Shim presented a modification of Choi et al.'s protocol. In this letter, we first show that Shim's modification is still insecure against insider attacks. We then present a modification of Choi et al.'s protocol that resists insider attacks. The counter-measure uses an ID-based signature on transcripts in order to bind them in a session. This prevents any replay of transcripts. Especially, by applying ID-based batch verification, the proposed one still consists of two rounds and is computationally efficient.