Attack on an ID-based authenticated group key agreement scheme from PKC 2004

  • Authors:
  • Fangguo Zhang;Xiaofeng Chen

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Electronics and Communication Engineering, Institute of Information Security Technology, Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangzhou 510275, PR China;International Research center for Information Security (IRIS), Information and Communications University (ICU), 103-6 Munji-dong Yusong-ku, Taejon 305-714, Republic of Korea

  • Venue:
  • Information Processing Letters
  • Year:
  • 2004

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Abstract

In PKC'04, Choi, Hwang and Lee [Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., vol. 2947, Springer-Verlag, 2004, pp. 130-144] proposed two group key agreement schemes from bilinear pairings: one is a bilinear variant of Burmester and Desmedt scheme [Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., vol. 950, Springer-Verlag, 1994, pp. 267-275] and the other is an ID-based authenticated scheme based on the former. In this paper, we propose an impersonation attack on their ID-based authenticated group key agreement scheme. We show that any two malicious users can impersonate an entity to agree some session keys in a new group if these two malicious users have the previous authentication transcripts of this entity. Therefore, their scheme cannot provide the authenticity as claimed.