Entity authentication and key distribution
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
Communication complexity of group key distribution
CCS '98 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Key Agreement in Dynamic Peer Groups
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Provably authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
SIAM Journal on Computing
Analysis of Key-Exchange Protocols and Their Use for Building Secure Channels
EUROCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Authenticated Multi-Party Key Agreement
ASIACRYPT '96 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Round-Optimal Contributory Conference Key Agreement
PKC '03 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
A Security Analysis of the Cliques Protocols Suites
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Tree-based group key agreement
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Attack on an ID-based authenticated group key agreement scheme from PKC 2004
Information Processing Letters
Efficient authenticated key agreement protocol for dynamic groups
WISA'04 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information Security Applications
New multiparty authentication services and key agreement protocols
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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A group key agreement protocol is designed to allow a group of parties communicating over an insecure, public network to agree on a common secret key. Recently, in WISA'04, Ren et al. proposed an efficient group key agreement scheme for dynamic groups, which can be built on any of secure two-party key establishment protocols. In the present work we study the main EGAKA-KE protocol of the scheme and point out a critical security flaw in the protocol. We show that the security flaw leads to a vulnerability to an active attack mounted by two colluding adversaries.