Role-Based Access Control Models
Computer
Protecting privacy using the decentralized label model
ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology (TOSEM)
Managing access control policies using access control spaces
SACMAT '02 Proceedings of the seventh ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
Towards a formal model for security policies specification and validation in the selinux system
Proceedings of the ninth ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
Verifying information flow goals in security-enhanced Linux
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on WITS'03
Labels and event processes in the asbestos operating system
Proceedings of the twentieth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
The flask security architecture: system support for diverse security policies
SSYM'99 Proceedings of the 8th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 8
A logical specification and analysis for SELinux MLS policy
Proceedings of the 12th ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
Making information flow explicit in HiStar
OSDI '06 Proceedings of the 7th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation - Volume 7
Detecting and resolving policy misconfigurations in access-control systems
Proceedings of the 13th ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
A learning-based approach for SELinux policy optimization with type mining
Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Workshop on Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Research
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Secure operating systems (secure OSes) are widely used to limit the damage caused by unauthorized access to Internet servers. However, writing a security policy based on the principle of least privilege for a secure OS is a challenge for an administrator. Considering that remote attackers can never attack a server before they establish connections to it, we propose a novel scheme that exploits phases to simplify security policy descriptions for Internet servers. In our scheme, the entire system has two execution phases: an initialization phase and a protocol processing phase. The initialization phase is defined as the phase before the server establishes connections to its clients, and the protocol processing phase is defined as the phase after it establishes connections. The key observation is that access control should be enforced by the secure OS only in the protocol processing phase to defend against remote attacks. Thus, we can omit the access-control policy in the initialization phase, which effectively reduces the number of policy rules. Our experimental results demonstrate that our scheme effectively reduces the number of descriptions; it eliminates 47.2%, 27.5%, and 24.0% of policy rules for HTTP, SMTP, and POP servers respectively, compared with an existing SELinux policy that includes the initialization of the server.