RBAC '97 Proceedings of the second ACM workshop on Role-based access control
The role graph model and conflict of interest
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) - Special issue on role-based access control
Integrating Flexible Support for Security Policies into the Linux Operating System
Proceedings of the FREENIX Track: 2001 USENIX Annual Technical Conference
Practical Domain and Type Enforcement for UNIX
SP '95 Proceedings of the 1995 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Policy management using access control spaces
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Analyzing integrity protection in the SELinux example policy
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
The flask security architecture: system support for diverse security policies
SSYM'99 Proceedings of the 8th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 8
A domain and type enforcement UNIX prototype
SSYM'95 Proceedings of the 5th conference on USENIX UNIX Security Symposium - Volume 5
A logical specification and analysis for SELinux MLS policy
Proceedings of the 12th ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
Multilevel filesystems in solaris trusted extensions
Proceedings of the 12th ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
A cryptographic access control architecture secure against privileged attackers
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Computer security architecture
Reusability of Functionality-Based Application Confinement Policy Abstractions
ICICS '08 Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Information and Communications Security
Simplifying security policy descriptions for internet servers in secure operating systems
Proceedings of the 2009 ACM symposium on Applied Computing
PolicyGlobe: a framework for integrating network and operating system security policies
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Assurable and usable security configuration
A logical specification and analysis for SELinux MLS policy
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
CUDACS: securing the cloud with CUDA-enabled secure virtualization
ICICS'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information and communications security
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
A tool for managing security policies in organisations
IWSEC'06 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Security
Information flow query and verification for security policy of security-enhanced linux
IWSEC'06 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Security
Towards access control model engineering
ICISS'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information Systems Security
Transforming commodity security policies to enforce Clark-Wilson integrity
Proceedings of the 28th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
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This paper presents a formal model, called SELAC, for analyzing an arbitrary security policy configuration for the SELinux system. A security policy for SELinux is complex and large: it is made by many configuration rules that refer to the access control sub-models implemented in the system. Among the rules composing a security policy configuration, many relationships occur and it is extremely difficult to understand their overall effects in the system. Our aim is to define semantics for the constructs of the SELinux configuration language and to model the relationships occurring among sets of configuration rules. Finally, we develop an algorithm based upon SELAC, which can verify whether, given an arbitrary security policy configuration, a given subject can access a given object in a given mode.